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I. Introduction 
In late 2016, Congress enacted the Holocaust Expropriated Art 
Recovery Act of 2016 (HEAR Act), a rare piece of bipartisan 
legislation in a time of growing political division.  The statute was 
meant to address a straightforward issue—the perception that U.S. 
courts were unfairly applying time-based defenses to bar claims to 
recover art lost during the Nazi regime.  The Act’s goal was simple: 
to provide victims of Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair 
opportunity to bring suit to recover works of art confiscated or 
misappropriated by the Nazis.  The mechanism through which to 
achieve this goal also seemed simple.  The HEAR Act temporarily 
(through 2026) replaces state and federal statutes of limitations 
pertaining to art recovery claims with a uniform six-year limitations 
period after actual knowledge of a claim arises.1  In light of systemic 
barriers to justice and a number of inconsistencies between 
 
† Simon J. Frankel is a partner with Covington & Burling LLP in San Francisco and a 
lecturer-in-law at Stanford Law School.  The author is grateful to Sophia Cai and Nia 
Joyner for helpful research assistance and to William Charron for thoughtful comments.  
The views expressed here are those of the author only, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of Covington & Burling LLP or any of its clients. 
 1 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
§ 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016). 
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jurisdictions, the legislation sought to ensure that worthy claimants 
would have their day in court. 
One can quibble as to whether the HEAR Act was really needed 
or justified.  I have elsewhere suggested that existing U.S. law was 
operating appropriately.2  At a minimum, the argument that U.S. 
museums were improperly asserting statutes of limitations and 
laches (an equitable doctrine barring claims brought after delay, 
where the delay caused prejudice to the defendant) appears flawed.3  
As I have argued, museums have important duties to safeguard their 
collections, and a claim that a museum has a work in its collection 
that was taken by the Nazis and should be returned implicates 
several of these duties.4  Specifically, a museum faced with such a 
claim has an obligation to investigate the claims carefully.  If the 
claim is found meritorious after a diligent investigation, meaning 
the work appears from all the available facts to belong to the 
claimant as a legal matter, the museum has a duty to return the work 
to the claimant.  But if the claim does not appear well-founded—
and we have to be honest, some asserted claims have not been 
factually well-supported—a museum has a corresponding duty not 
to turn the work over to the claimant.  In fact, the museum has a 
duty to safeguard the integrity of its collection.  That duty includes, 
where appropriate, litigating to retain the work, including 
interposing any potentially meritorious defenses that may 
efficiently end the litigation in the museum’s favor, to prevent 
unnecessary dissipation of trust assets.  Such defenses include 
statutes of limitations and laches.5 
Even if the HEAR Act was a solution in search of a problem, it 
is now the law of the land, so we have to understand what it means 
and how it should be applied.  However, the Act is not a model of 
clarity.  On one level, it is very simple; as noted, it provides for a 
nationwide six-year limitations period for a claimant to bring a 
lawsuit to recover a work lost during the period of Nazi persecution 
after “actual knowledge” of the claim.6  As explained in a prior 
 
 2 See Simon J. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums’ Initiation of Declaratory 
Judgment Actions and Assertion of Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era Art 
Restitution Claims—A Defense, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279 (2013). 
 3 Id. at 307–36. 
 4 Id. at 287–302. 
 5 Frankel & Forrest, supra note 2, at 302–07. 
 6 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
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article, the scope of the Act, its actual operation, and how certain 
statutory exceptions apply are areas fraught with confusion, either 
because the statute is poorly drafted or because courts or 
commentators have not applied the Act faithfully or fairly.7  More 
generally, where the HEAR Act allows a claim to proceed timely 
(without regard to otherwise applicable limitations periods), courts 
seem confused about the application of the laches doctrine. 
After a brief review of the HEAR Act and the doctrine of laches, 
this Article focuses on several recent Nazi era art restitution cases 
to consider how courts are faring in applying the HEAR Act and 
laches.8 
II. The HEAR Act 
As noted, the key operative provision of the HEAR Act sets a 
nationwide statute of limitations for any claims to recover art lost to 
the Nazis.  It provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law or 
any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except as 
otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of action 
against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property that 
was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution 
may be commenced not later than 6 years after the actual 
discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of— (1) the 
identity and location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a 
possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or other 
property.9 
The “covered period” runs from 1933 to 1945,10 and “Nazi 
persecution” is defined as “any persecution of a specific group of 
 
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016). 
 7 See Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and 
Uncertainties of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 157 (2019). 
 8 This Article focuses on recent court decisions concerning the HEAR Act and 
laches in cases involving Nazi-looted art. For a broader discussion of issues involved in 
Nazi-looted art, see generally Donald S. Burris, Restoration of a Culture: A California 
Lawyer’s Lengthy Quest to Restitute Nazi-Looted Art, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 277 (2020) 
(providing an overview of Nazi looting and a chronology of relevant American legal 
cases); Marc Masurovsky, A Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities, 
& Stolen Indigenous Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous 
art and Nazi plunder, as well as related sociological implications). 
 9 HEAR Act § 5(a). 
 10 Id. § 4(3). 
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individuals based on Nazi ideology by the Government of Germany, 
its allies or agents, members of the Nazi Party, or their agents or 
associates, during the covered period.”11  Notably, “actual 
discovery” is defined as “knowledge,”12 which in turn is defined as 
“having actual knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient 
information with regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount 
to actual knowledge thereof.”13 
Once a claimant has actual knowledge (not constructive 
knowledge—the “knew or should have known” standard common 
under many state limitations periods) of the location of the artwork 
and the basis for a claim to it, the claimant has six years to file suit,14 
even if the otherwise applicable state limitations period would be 
shorter.  This is the rule through 2026, when the HEAR Act 
sunsets.15 
III. Recent Cases Grappling with the HEAR Act and Laches 
As the HEAR Act swept aside, in most instances, application of 
statutes of limitation, it is perhaps not surprising that some recent 
cases have focused more on the equitable defense of laches.  Under 
this doctrine, a claim will be barred at equity where the plaintiff has 
delayed unreasonably in asserting a claim and that delay causes 
prejudice to the defendant.16  Such prejudice can be in the form of 
lost evidence, lost witnesses, or other detriment.17  Three notable 
recent cases have grappled with aspects of the HEAR Act and 
laches. 
A. Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art 
Zuckerman involved a claim to recover a Picasso painting 
currently in the possession of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.18  
The plaintiff’s grand-uncle, Paul Leffmann, had fled Germany for 
Italy in the late 1930s with his wife Alice.19  After a period of 
 
 11 Id. § 4(5). 
 12 Id. § 4(1). 
 13 Id. § 4(4). 
 14 Id. §§ 4(1)–5(a). 
 15 HEAR Act § 5(d). 
 16 Frankel & Forrest, supra note 2, at 305. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 19 Id. at 307. 
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negotiations, they sold the painting, which had been kept in 
Switzerland, to procure funds to flee persecution in Fascist Italy.20  
They eventually escaped to Brazil and, after the war, settled in 
Switzerland.21  They made claims after the war to a number of works 
that had been taken from them in Germany, but never pursued the 
Picasso painting.22  Meanwhile, the painting surfaced in New York 
in 1939 and was donated to the Metropolitan Museum in 1952, 
where it has since been on view.23 
At the trial court level, the plaintiffs argued the claim was timely 
under the HEAR Act, but the district court did not reach the Act.  
Rather, the district court held on the museum’s motion to dismiss 
that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that the Leffmanns had 
sold the work only as a result of duress.24  Under both Italian and 
New York law, the district court held that duress cannot be based 
on “a general state of fear arising from political circumstances.”25  
The threat to the party entering into the agreement must be 
sufficiently specific and, in New York, the threat must also be made 
by the defendant.26  The plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that 
the work was lost due to duress, rather than sold, by the 
Leffmanns.27 
By disposing of the case on duress, the trial court also did not 
address an interesting issue under the HEAR Act: whether the 
painting was, in the words of the HEAR Act, “lost . . . because of” 
Nazi persecution.28  Of course, according to the complaint, the 
Leffmanns had left Germany due to persecution, and were seeking 
to leave Italy for the same reason—and sold the painting to obtain 
funds for passage.29  However, there are indications in the text of 
the Act (although not so much in its legislative history) that the “lost 
 
 20 Id. at 312. 
 21 Id. at 314. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 24 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 25 Id. at 317. 
 26 Id. at 318. 
 27 Id. at 319–20. 
 28 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016). 
 29 Complaint at 1–2, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 16-cv-7665). 
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because of” language is best interpreted as “lost to” the Nazis.30  
That was not true for the Leffmanns, so did the HEAR Act 
necessarily apply to extend the time for bringing the claim?  Future 
cases will have to grapple with this issue. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit approached the case differently.  
Its opinion did not address duress or the “lost because of” language.  
Instead, looking at the complaint, the court held that the claim was 
barred by laches.31  The court found unreasonable delay by the 
plaintiff in bringing suit, since the Leffmanns knew who they sold 
the painting to in 1938; the painting was acquired by a well-known 
public institution in 1952; and it could have easily been located 
before Alice Leffmann died in 1966.32  As noted by the court, the 
Leffmanns made post-war restitution claims for other works they 
lost in Germany, but made no efforts to recover the Picasso.33  The 
court also found that there was plausibly prejudice to the museum 
from this delay in filing, as many witnesses to the transactions that 
took the painting from the Leffmanns to the museum were long 
gone by the time the Leffmanns’ heir made a claim in 2010.34 
Although the Second Circuit marshalled facts supporting 
unreasonable delay and prejudice, the result is somewhat odd.  As 
the Second Circuit acknowledged, application of the equitable 
doctrine of laches is “ordinarily fact-intensive.”35  It is very rarely 
addressed on the pleadings.36  Here, the Second Circuit found 
 
 30 See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 179–82. 
 31 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 193–97 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 32 Id. at 193–94. 
 33 Id. at 191–92. 
 34 Id. at 194–95. 
 35 Id. at 194. 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting By Egon Schiele, No. 99 
CIV. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (“To show laches 
here, the Leopold would have to show that Bondi and her heirs unreasonably delayed in 
starting an action and that the Leopold suffered undue prejudice as a result.  This would 
involve a fact-intensive inquiry into the conduct and background of both parties in order 
to determine the relative equities.  Such issues are often not amenable to resolution on a 
motion for summary judgment, let alone a motion to dismiss.”) (internal citations omitted); 
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7664 (KMW), 
1999 WL 673347, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (“In many cases, the application of the 
laches defense is an issue for trial . . . . In some cases, however, the record is sufficiently 
clear on summary judgment to establish whether or not a particular search was diligent.”); 
cf. Solow Bldg. Co., LLC v. Nine West Group, Inc., No. 00–7685 (DC), 2001 WL 736794, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2001) (“[W]hen the defense of laches is clear on the face of the 
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prejudice largely from the fact that several witnesses to the 1938 
transaction had died.37  There is some logic in this reasoning, but 
one might expect more detailed consideration of what information 
was lost by these deaths, rather than simply an appellate court’s 
assertion that the loss of witnesses must prejudice the defendant.38  
Notably, the dates of death implicated by the court were not in the 
plaintiff’s complaint; the Second Circuit apparently took them from 
outside the record.39  The court also referred in passing to “the likely 
disappearance of documentary evidence”40—not a convincing 
showing where the defendant bears the burden of proof on the 
defense of laches.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a 
laches defense should not be applied in reference to a mechanical 
application of a statute of limitations, but that courts must consider 
the equity to all parties involved.41  The Zuckerman court did not 
dwell on equities.  To be sure, further facts and further consideration 
might have driven the court to the same result at a later stage; but it 
was an unusual ruling at the motion to dismiss stage. 
More generally, the Second Circuit’s conclusion that prejudice 
flowed from the “more than six decades that have elapsed since the 
end of World War II”42 would potentially apply to most any claim 
to recover art lost under the Nazis.  It will be interesting to see if 
other courts addressing claims to Nazi-looted art pick up on this 
language and apply it in other cases at the pleading stage.  Will all 
such claims now be dismissed on the pleadings based on laches? 
On a second issue, the Second Circuit was on firmer footing.  
 
complaint, and where it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid the 
insuperable bar, a court may consider the defense on a motion to dismiss.”); see generally 
Espino v. Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he factual issues 
involved in a laches defense can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary 
inquiry.”) (citing additional cases). 
 37 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 38 See McDaniel v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 228 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1955) 
(“There has been an extraordinary delay.  The libel was filed more than four years after 
the collision, which occurred nearly ten years ago. In spite of the absence of any 
explanation, we cannot see that the delay ipso facto should defeat the claim. Although one 
of the claimant’s witnesses died before trial, this was misfortune whose consequences 
cannot be pressed so far.”) (Learned Hand, J.). 
 39 See generally Complaint, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 16-cv-7665). 
 40 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 194. 
 41 See Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1951). 
 42 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 194. 
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This was its holding that the HEAR Act does not abrogate laches as 
a defense.43  That is, while a restitution claim will not be barred as 
untimely by a statute of limitations unless brought more than six 
years after actual knowledge, such a claim may still be barred by 
laches if the state law requirements of that doctrine are met.44  
Notably, some commentators and courts, including the Reif trial 
decision discussed below, had concluded that the HEAR Act 
preempts laches, as well as statutes of limitations.45  As explained 
previously, laches had an interesting ride in the legislative history 
of the HEAR Act.46  An early version of the statute would have 
explicitly preempted both statutes of limitations and laches.47  But 
the references to laches and defenses “at equity” were removed from 
the bill in Congress and, as enacted, the statute only refers to 
sweeping aside “any defense at law relating to the passage of 
time.”48  Given this text and history, the sensible conclusion is that 
the HEAR Act addresses only statutes of limitations—as the Second 
Circuit held in Zuckerman.49 
 
 43 See id. at 195−97. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 176 nn. 104−06. 
 46 See id. at 175. 
 47 162 CONG. REC. S1813 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2016) (“SEC. 5. Statute of Limitations. 
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any provision of 
State law, or any defense at law or equity relating to the passage of time (including the 
doctrine of laches), a civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any 
artwork or other cultural property unlawfully lost because of persecution during the Nazi 
era or for damages for the taking or detaining of any artwork or other cultural property 
unlawfully lost because of persecution during the Nazi era may be commenced not later 
than 6 years after the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of— (1) 
the identity and location of the artwork or cultural property; and (2) information or facts 
sufficient to indicate that the claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the artwork 
or cultural property that was unlawfully lost.”). 
 48 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).; see S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 7 (2016). 
 49 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 
Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 175–76).  The plaintiff in Zuckerman has argued that 
laches cannot apply under the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), where the Court stated that “in [the] face of a statute of 
limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be involved to bar legal relief.”  Petrella, 
572 U.S. at 679. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (2018) (No. 16-cv-
07665), 2017 WL 2472009, at *14.  But Petrella applied the federal statute of limitations 
in a federal statute—the Copyright Act.  It would be an odd result to say that by providing 
for a minimum of six years to bring a covered claim, Congress otherwise abrogated state 
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B. Reif v. Nagy 
Reif v. Nagy, decided by New York’s Appellate Division in July 
2019,50 also has its troubling aspects.  The claimants sued an art 
dealer to recover two works by Egon Schiele.51  Franz Freidrich 
Grunbaum, a Jewish cabaret performer in Austria, owned the works 
as part of a collection before he was captured by the Nazis in 1938 
and murdered in the Dachau concentration camp in 1941.52  The 
dealer, Nagy, contended that he, not the plaintiffs, had good title to 
the works.53  Although the plaintiffs were heirs to Grunbaum, the 
dealer asserted that Mr. Grunbaum’s sister-in-law had sold the two 
works (among others) to a gallery in Switzerland in a legitimate 
sale.54 
A twist in the case was that the same plaintiffs had previously 
litigated in federal court over ownership of a work that came from 
the very same collection and had the same provenance as the work 
at issue in Reif.  In this prior case, Bakalar v. Vavra, the Second 
Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s findings after a bench 
trial that the work had not been stolen by the Nazis and that any 
claim to the work was barred by laches.55 
In an earlier interlocutory appeal in the new case, the Appellate 
Division held that the plaintiffs were not collaterally estopped by 
the judgment in Bakalar from litigating ownership and laches 
because the three works at issue in the two cases “are not part of a 
collection unified in legal interest such to impute the status of one 
to another.”56  This cursory holding was itself a bit surprising, as the 
Schiele work at issue in Bakalar did have a shared provenance with 
 
law for state law claims, including laches, particularly where Congress considered doing 
so in the HEAR Act and then decided not to include laches in the preemptive language of 
the Act.  Indeed, in a footnote, the Petrella opinion acknowledged that “[w]hen state law 
was the reference, federal courts sometimes applied laches as further control.”  Petrella, 
572 U.S. at 680 n.16. 
 50 Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5, 175 A.D.3d 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 51 Id. at 109. 
 52 Id. at 109–10. 
 53 Id. at 120. 
 54 Id. at 114. 
 55 Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 56 Reif v. Nagy, 52 N.Y.S.3d 100, 102, 149 A.D.3d 532, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
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the two works at issue in Reif v. Nagy.57 
In any event, on remand and at summary judgment, the New 
York trial court ruled in favor of the Reif plaintiffs.58  As I have 
written elsewhere, that decision was troubling in two respects.59  
First, the court, with no analysis, concluded that the HEAR Act 
abrogates any laches defense “where Nazi-looted art is at issue.”60  
The defendants pointed out that the draft HEAR Act had been 
amended to omit mention of laches and referred only to statutes of 
limitations and defenses of law, but the trial court would have none 
of it, saying: “[t]he statute of limitations and laches defenses fail.”61  
As discussed, and as the Second Circuit held in Zuckerman, there is 
no way to square this simplistic conclusion as to laches with the text 
and legislative history of the HEAR Act.  Laches is (or at least 
should be) alive and well post-HEAR Act. 
The Reif trial court’s second error was more subtle, but in some 
ways more significant.  In essence, the court treated the HEAR Act 
as not just a new rule for timeliness, but as an interpretive lens that 
must substantively shape how a court looks at claims to Nazi-looted 
art.  At summary judgment, with contested issues of fact, the trial 
court swept factual issues aside, asserting that Congress “adopted 
the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art 
(Principles) in the HEAR Act” and that “[t]he HEAR Act compels 
us to help return Nazi-looted art to its heirs.”62  This is odd because 
the HEAR Act does not contain any operative language adopting 
any particular aspect of the Washington Conference Principles, 
aside from the specific provision providing for a nationwide 
limitations period.63 
The Reif trial court went on to declare that the HEAR Act and 
related policy instruct courts “to be mindful of the difficulty of 
tracing artwork provenance due to the atrocities of the Holocaust 
 
 57 See Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 176–77, 182–83. 
 60 Reif v. Nagy, No. 161799/2015, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *14 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 4, 2018). 
 61 Id.; see Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 23, Reif v. Nagy, 52 N.Y.S.3d 100, 149 A.D.3d 532 (2017) (No. 240). 
 62 Reif, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *6–7. 
 63 See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 182–86. 
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era, and to facilitate the return of property where there is reasonable 
proof that the rightful owner is before us.”64  Notably, the only 
citation provided for this sentence was the provision in the 
Holocaust Victims Redress Act setting out the “sense of the 
Congress” that “governments should undertake good faith efforts to 
facilitate the return” of Nazi-looted property to rightful owners.65  
Based on this, the court simply stated, “[w]e accept that the 
Artworks were the property of Mr. Grunbaum, and that the entirety 
of Mr. Grunbaum’s property was looted by the Nazis.”66  The judge 
seemed to find it sufficient to grant summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs that “[they] made a threshold showing that they have an 
arguable claim of a superior right of possession to the Artworks.”67  
As I have written previously, it is not appropriate statutory 
interpretation to give some broad inchoate effect to the “sense of 
Congress” that “governments should undertake good faith efforts to 
facilitate the return” of Nazi-looted property to rightful owners.68  A 
basic canon of interpretation holds that prefatory statements of 
purpose should not be understood to add to the specific operations 
of a statute’s text.69  The HEAR Act’s operative provisions all focus 
on protecting those seeking to bring claims to recover artwork lost 
due to Nazi persecution from statutes of limitations or “any defense 
at law relating to the passage of time.”70  No provisions specifically 
provide for anything other than a nationwide statute of limitations 
of six years from actual knowledge.71  Thus, it is not proper to read 
the HEAR Act to place a broad thumb on the scale in favor of 
plaintiffs seeking to recover art lost in the Holocaust, as the Reif trial 
 
 64 Reif, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *9. 
 65 Id. at *7 (citing Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 
Stat. 15 (1998)). 
 66 Id. at *9. 
 67 Id. at *9–10. 
 68 Id. at *7 (citing Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 202). See Frankel & Sharoni, 
supra note 7, at 182–86.   
 69 Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 185; see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 219 (1st ed. 2012); see 
also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (noting that broad interpretations 
purporting to “advanc[e]” a statute’s purpose are usually disfavored because “no law 
pursues its purpose at all costs.”). 
 70 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).; Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 185. 
 71 Id. 
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court did.  The HEAR Act allows a plaintiff to bring a claim that 
might otherwise be untimely; it does not loosen the burden the 
plaintiff must meet to succeed on the claim.72 
On appeal, the Appellate Division avoided the mistake of 
assuming the HEAR Act abrogates laches, but took its own odd 
turns.  On the merits, it found that the plaintiffs had established a 
claim of ownership in the works, and that the defendant, Nagy, had 
not rebutted that claim.73  This is a different result than Bakalar on 
effectively the same facts.74  But if one accepts that collateral 
estoppel does not apply, then one might accept the Appellate 
Division’s holding—except for what that court then said in its 
conclusion: “We are informed by the intent and provisions of the 
HEAR Act which highlights the context in which plaintiffs, who 
lost their rightful property during World War II, bear the burden of 
proving superior title to specific property in an action under the 
traditional principles of New York law.”75 
What are we to make of this statement?  The court does not 
explain how its decision was “informed by the intent and provisions 
of the HEAR Act,”76  so we are left to wonder if the appellate court, 
like the trial court, viewed the HEAR Act as an interpretive thumb 
on the scale in favor of any claimant to recover art lost under the 
Nazis, rather than only a lengthened statutory period for bringing 
the claim.  That suspicion is fueled by what the court remarked next 
in closing: 
It is important to note that we are not making a declaration 
as a matter of law that plaintiffs established the estate’s 
absolute title to the Artworks.  Rather, we are 
adjudicating the parties’ respective superior ownership 
and possessory interests.  We find the plaintiffs have met 
their burden of proving superior title to the Artworks.77 
Again, this is puzzling.  Does the court mean the plaintiffs did 
not establish ownership, but simply failed less than the defendants 
in showing ownership, and so prevailed?  In such a situation, does 
the HEAR Act, in the view of the Appellate Division, give the tie to 
 
 72 HEAR Act § 3(2). 
 73 Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 109–10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 74 Id. at 115–16. 
 75 Id. at 132. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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the claimant?  It should not, as explained above, but the appellate 
court did not explain further. 
The second odd aspect to this decision is the Appellate 
Division’s rejection of laches because it reasoned that, since Nagy 
had purchased the work in 2013, he could not claim any prejudice, 
due to the claimants’ failure to bring the claim decades earlier: 
“Nagy acquired both pieces in 2013.  He suffered no change in 
position.  Nor was any evidence lost between defendants’ 
acquisition and plaintiffs’ demand for the return of the Artworks.”78  
Now, to be clear, this was an unusual situation: Nagy had known of 
the plaintiffs’ claims to the Grunbaum collection before he 
purchased the two Schiele works at issue.79  He had filed an amicus 
brief in the earlier Bakalar v. Vavra litigation.80  And in fact, he had 
purchased title insurance for the very purpose of insuring against 
plaintiffs’ claims (so perhaps the court viewed its holding as not 
unfair).81 
But the Appellate Division’s reasoning—and the rule its 
decision establishes—is troubling.  In effect, this decision restarts 
the laches clock whenever the personal property changes hands.  
Historically, as noted, courts considering laches looked at the 
plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay and the prejudice to the defendant 
from that delay.  This has often included evidence lost even before 
the defendant acquired the property, because had the plaintiff 
asserted a claim for the work earlier, the ownership issue as between 
the plaintiff, or predecessor-in-interest, and the then-possessor 
would have been resolved long ago—and at a time when any 
evidence would have been available.  So the defendant, now the 
possessor, would not have been prejudiced. 
Interestingly, there appears to be little law on this precise 
issue—whether the clock starts over on laches prejudice when 
property changes hands from one good-faith possessor to another.  
A few courts appear to have assumed that prejudice arises during 
any time of the claimants’ undue delay, not only during the 
defendant’s period of ownership.82  One court, in a Nazi-looted art 
 
 78 Id. at 130. 
 79 Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 117–18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 80 Id. at 130–31. 
 81 Id. at 118. 
 82 See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6, 8 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding undue 
prejudice as “[t]here can be no serious dispute that the deaths of family members—Lukacs 
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restitution case, held that, under California law, the statute of 
limitations begins anew where a new possessor acquires the work 
on the theory that the new possession is a new tort.83  Before Reif, 
no court appears to have applied that rule to laches.  On the other 
hand, courts have held that that a new limitations period does not 
spring into life with each new claimant.  For example, where an 
original owner dies after knowing of her claim for many years and 
not bringing suit, her heir does not have a new chance to bring suit 
against the current possessor within the limitations period following 
the death.84 
As a matter of policy, it appears that once the standard for an 
unreasonable delay and prejudice is met for a particular claimant 
with respect to a particular piece of art, that delay should apply to 
each subsequent owner of that art.  If a potential claimant, or her 
predecessor-in-interest, unreasonably slept on her rights, that 
claimant should not get another bite at the apple simply because the 
current possessor of the work sold the piece.  The law on this point 
is unclear, and we will have to see if future courts follow the rule 
set out in Reif v. Nagy. 
C. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation 
In Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation,85 
claimants sued a Spanish art foundation, seeking to recover a 
painting Nazis apparently extorted from their great-grandmother as 
a condition to issuing her an exit visa out of Germany during World 
War II.86  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the HEAR Act 
applied to the claim and rendered it timely, even if it might be time-
barred under otherwise applicable California law.87  This was 
 
and others of her generation, and the next—have deprived Bakalar of key witnesses”) 
(citations omitted); In re Flamenbaum, 22 N.Y. 3d 962, 966 (2013); Werthheimer v. 
Cirkar’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, 300 A.D.2d 117, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).  
 83 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-2866-
JFW(JTLx), 2015 WL 12910626, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015). 
 84 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (N.D. Ohio 
2006) (noting heirs could not seek painting where claim had lapsed during lifetime of 
predecessor-in-interest); see generally Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15 
(1839) (“the heirs of [an ancestor] cannot be entitled to be put in a better predicament than 
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 85 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 86 Id. at 951. 
 87 Id. at 960. 
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consistent with the terms of the Act, which apply to any claim 
pending in state or federal court as of December 2016.88 
But the Cassirer court then addressed a more interesting 
problem: Did the HEAR Act foreclose defenses otherwise provided 
under Spanish law, which the district court had found governed the 
dispute?  Specifically, the defendant foundation claimed that it had 
acquired title to the painting through prescriptive acquisition under 
Spanish law—by possessing the work without challenge for a 
certain period of time.89  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this was a 
defense on the merits.90  While the HEAR Act bars defenses based 
on the passage of time, it did not provide new substantive law, and 
so did not bar the foundation’s defense that it acquired title to the 
painting under Spanish property laws.91  Ultimately, on remand, the 
foundation prevailed in establishing prescriptive acquisition under 
Spanish law.92 
This outcome—just or unjust—is consistent with the very clear 
but narrow purpose of the HEAR Act.  The Cassirer claim was 
timely under the Act, but the claim could still fail on the merits 
under governing law.  The claimants were entitled to litigate their 
claim, but not to have it subject to any different rules of decision 
than would otherwise govern. 
IV. Conclusion 
There is none, and that is pretty much the point.  Courts have to 
keep addressing cases with a greater focus on the facts and equities 
of individual cases.  The HEAR Act simplifies Nazi-era art 
restitution cases, but only a little.  In many cases, it will make timely 
a claim that would otherwise have been time-barred under state law.  
But the Act does no more.  It does not sweep aside laches.  It also 
does not create an interpretive framework for resolving these 
claims—it is no thumb on the scale in favor of a claimant.  Once the 
timeliness of a claim under an otherwise applicable statute of 
 
 88 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 
§ 5(d), 130 Stat. 1526–27 (2016).  
 89 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 960–64. 
 90 Id. at 965. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza 
Collection Foundation, No. 2:05-cv-03459-JFW-E (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019), ECF No. 
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limitations is determined, the work of the HEAR Act is done.  But 
the work of the courts is not done; they must remain focused on facts 
and law, to determine if a laches defense, if asserted, is valid, and if 
a substantive claim has been established by a claimant under 
applicable law. 
 
